russia’s global relationships are undergoing a dramatic transformation. Driven largely by the geopolitical fallout from its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow is actively cultivating new alliances, particularly with regimes previously on the fringe of international acceptance. Simultaneously, long-standing partnerships, especially within the former Soviet sphere, are fraying and dissolving. This profound shift sees players like the Taliban and North Korea gaining prominence in Russia’s diplomatic circle, while traditional partners like azerbaijan and armenia are increasingly charting independent courses away from Moscow’s influence.
Moscow Courts New Partners Amid Isolation
Since early 2022, facing Western sanctions and condemnation over the Ukraine conflict, the Kremlin has intensified efforts to build ties with nations often considered adversaries by the US and European Union. This strategy focuses on enhancing economic and military cooperation, essential for sustaining Russia’s war effort and mitigating its international isolation.
Deepening Ties with Iran and North Korea
Iran was among the first countries to significantly strengthen its relationship with Moscow. Tehran provided Russia with thousands of Shahed attack drones. Crucially, Iran also shared the technical knowledge required for Russia to establish its own domestic drone production lines. These Iranian-designed drones, now manufactured in increasing numbers in Russia, play a vital role in Moscow’s ongoing bombing campaigns targeting Ukrainian cities, infrastructure, and civilians.
In January 2025, Russia and Iran formalized their burgeoning partnership by signing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty. President Vladimir Putin hailed this agreement as a “real breakthrough.” However, the limits of this alliance were exposed when Moscow offered only diplomatic rhetoric, rather than concrete support, after Israel and the US conducted airstrikes against Iranian targets. Putin labelled the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities as “unprovoked aggression” lacking “basis or justification,” a statement made even as Russia’s own unprovoked war in Ukraine entered its fourth year.
By late 2024, as Iranian drone technology had not delivered decisive victory in Ukraine, Moscow brought in another ally: North Korea. This support manifested not in technology but in manpower. Following a Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024, North Korea sent tens of thousands of soldiers to bolster Russian troops.
Initial deployments in autumn 2024 saw 11,000 North Korean soldiers arrive. Western officials estimated that approximately 4,000 of these troops were killed or injured. Despite these casualties, Pyongyang’s military cooperation with Moscow has only intensified. North Korea is now reportedly preparing to triple its initial contribution, planning to send as many as 30,000 additional soldiers to reinforce Russian forces in the coming months. Ukrainian intelligence sources suggest these new troops could arrive relatively soon.
Russia Recognises the Taliban
In a move met with international backlash, Russia became the first country globally to officially recognise the Taliban as the ruling government of Afghanistan. Russia’s Foreign Ministry stated this formal recognition aimed to “give impetus to the development of productive bilateral cooperation… in various fields.” The Taliban, an Islamist militant group, took control of Afghanistan in August 2021 after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces.
Neither the United States nor the European Union have formally recognised the Taliban government. Washington continues to designate the group as a terrorist organisation. Despite this, Russian officials have openly embraced the group. In July 2024, President Putin referred to the Taliban as “allies in the fight against terrorism.” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has also publicly called them “sane people.” This recognition underscores Russia’s pragmatic approach to forming alliances, prioritizing shared interests, even with groups internationally designated as terrorists.
Losing Ground: Estrangement from Former Allies
While forging new relationships, Russia’s influence within the ex-Soviet space, a region Moscow traditionally considers its sphere of influence, is diminishing. The most striking example of this decline is the disintegration of Russia’s long-held dominance in the South Caucasus region.
For decades, Russia was the central power broker in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Karabakh region. However, in September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed full control of Karabakh through a swift military campaign. Nearly two years later, Armenia and Azerbaijan are making historic progress towards normalising relations and finalising a peace accord.
Crucially, these peace efforts are unfolding without Russia’s mediation. Instead, Turkey, a close ally of Azerbaijan, has become increasingly involved. This marks a significant departure from the past, where Moscow dictated the terms of engagement in the region. As a result, Russia’s relationships with both Baku and Yerevan have reached unprecedented lows.
Deteriorating Relations with Azerbaijan
Tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia have escalated dramatically. One major incident occurred in December 2024 when an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger jet crashed near Grozny in Russia. Azerbaijani authorities alleged the jet was accidentally hit by Russian air defences. The plane attempted an emergency landing in Kazakhstan but crashed, killing 38 people.
President Putin offered an apology for the “tragic incident” but avoided explicitly accepting responsibility. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev publicly criticised Moscow for attempting to “hush up” the event and demanded punishment for those responsible. Relations worsened significantly thereafter.
In May 2025, Aliyev notably declined to attend Russia’s Victory Day parade in Moscow, a gathering typically attended by leaders of former Soviet states. Later that month, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister visited Baku, signalling strengthening ties between Azerbaijan and Kyiv, a move likely viewed unfavourably by the Kremlin.
Tensions reached a boiling point more recently. Russian police conducted controversial raids targeting the homes of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg, Russia’s fourth-largest city. Authorities claimed the raids were part of a decades-old murder investigation. Tragically, two ethnic Azerbaijanis died in the raids, and several others were injured.
Baku reacted strongly. Azerbaijan cancelled planned Russian official visits, summoned the Russian ambassador to protest, and called off Russian cultural events. The backlash culminated with Azerbaijani authorities raiding the offices of Russia’s state-run news agency Sputnik Azerbaijan. The executive director and editor-in-chief were subsequently detained for four months.
Hours later, President Aliyev held a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Zelenskyy publicly stated he expressed support for Baku “in a situation where Russia is bullying Azerbaijani citizens and threatening the Republic of Azerbaijan.” This further angered Moscow. Shortly after, an Azerbaijani news outlet released what it claimed was a recording suggesting the Russian military deliberately ordered the December 2024 missile strike on the AZAL flight, though detailed evidence was not fully provided. Aliyev himself previously stated three days after the crash that the plane “was shot down by Russia,” though he added it may not have been intentional.
Armenia Drifts Towards the West
Azerbaijan’s rapid success in Karabakh in 2023 served as a stark wake-up call for Armenia. Like Syria and Iran before it, Armenia discovered that Russia, preoccupied and resource-stretched by the Ukraine war, was unwilling or unable to intervene decisively to protect its ally. Military analysts noted Russia’s diminished capacity since its full-scale invasion began in February 2022.
In the weeks following the 2023 Karabakh operation, Armenia took significant steps away from Moscow. It ratified the International Criminal Court (ICC) statute. The ICC had previously issued an arrest warrant for President Putin regarding alleged illegal deportations of Ukrainian children, a warrant issued months before Armenia joined the court’s jurisdiction.
The shift continued in 2024 with Armenia freezing its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Kremlin-led military alliance often seen as Russia’s answer to NATO. This was an unprecedented move for a founding CSTO member.
By early 2025, Armenia signalled its long-term trajectory by adopting a bill aimed at initiating the process of joining the European Union. Such a move is fundamentally opposed by Moscow, which views EU expansion into the post-Soviet space as a direct challenge to its influence.
Russia has attempted to mend ties. Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Yerevan in May 2025, seeking to stabilise and reinforce the relationship. However, almost simultaneously, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas visited Armenia and signed a partnership agreement. Armenia’s Foreign Ministry reported concluding negotiations on a new partnership agenda and launching defence and security consultations aimed at aligning cooperation with “current challenges,” clearly hinting at the need for alternatives to Russian security guarantees.
Perhaps the most symbolic development occurred not in Yerevan, but Istanbul. While Lavrov was in Armenia, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was in Turkey meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This meeting, previously almost unthinkable, focused on normalising relations between the two countries, which currently have no formal diplomatic ties. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan over the Karabakh conflict. Armenia is seeking the reopening of this border to alleviate its isolation. With tensions soaring between Azerbaijan and Russia, Erdoğan has publicly stated he will support Armenia’s peace efforts with Azerbaijan, further underscoring the dramatic reorientation of regional alliances away from Moscow.
The confluence of events – Russia’s embrace of new pariah partners like the Taliban and North Korea, coupled with the sharp deterioration of ties with historical allies in the South Caucasus like Azerbaijan and Armenia – highlights the profound and potentially lasting impact of the Ukraine conflict on global and regional geopolitics. Russia’s diminished capacity and shifting priorities are redrawing the diplomatic map, creating new opportunities and challenges for states caught in the balance of power.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why is Russia’s list of allies changing so drastically?
Russia’s shift in alliances is primarily a consequence of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine since early 2022. The conflict has led to international isolation and Western sanctions, prompting Moscow to seek partners willing to provide economic support, military aid (like drones or troops), or diplomatic recognition, often among nations also facing international restrictions. Concurrently, the war has strained Russia’s resources and reduced its capacity to support traditional allies, leading those partners to seek security and diplomatic alternatives elsewhere.
Which countries are now considered Russia’s main new allies?
Based on recent developments, Russia is significantly deepening ties with Iran and North Korea, primarily for military and economic support vital to the Ukraine conflict. Russia has also become the first country to formally recognise the Taliban as the ruling government of Afghanistan, signaling a pragmatic diplomatic alignment despite the group’s international status. These relationships contrast sharply with Russia’s deteriorating ties with former allies.
How has the conflict in Ukraine impacted Russia’s traditional alliances?
The Ukraine war has severely strained Russia’s traditional alliances. Being bogged down in Ukraine has reduced Russia’s military capacity and willingness to intervene on behalf of long-standing partners, as seen in the 2023 Karabakh conflict where Armenia felt unsupported. This has prompted countries like Armenia to actively pursue alternative security arrangements and diplomatic paths, including closer ties with the European Union and even normalising relations with historical adversaries like Turkey, effectively drifting away from Moscow’s orbit and influence.
